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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY:
A NEW FEDERALISM?
The authority delegated to Congress by the United States Constitu-
tion to "regualte commerce . . among the several states"' has fre-
quently been a source of conflict between the states and the federal
government. This conflict, often cast in terms of state sovereignty
versus federal supremacy, has played a prominent role in commerce
clause litigation before the Supreme Court.2 In such cases the Supreme
Court has frequently utilized a balancing test that weighs respective
state and federal interests. 3 Implicit in this test is the recognition that
certain state interests demand local enforcement, while other matters
require the extension of national jurisdiction over state law in order to
effectuate national goals and policies. In National League of Cities v.
Usery,4 however, the Supreme Court seemingly departed from the
balancing approach and recognized that the Constitution prohibits the
exercise of the legislative authority under the commerce clause in a
manner which impairs the states' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional state governmental functions. 5
Appellants, individual cities and states, sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief, claiming that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act6 were unconstitutional because Congress had exercised
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. "Federal legislation of this character must be construed with due regard to accom-
modation between the assertions of new federal authority and the functions of the
individual States, as reflecting the historic and persistent concerns of our dual system of
government." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767, 780 (1947). See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upheld application
of the Economic Stabilization Act to wages and salaries of state employees); California
v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Railway Labor Act held applicable to a common carrier
owned and operated by the state of California); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 399 (1951) (state law superseded
by federal legislation).
3. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5. Id. at 845.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. IV 1974). Appellants were the National League of
Cities, the National Governor's Conference, the states of Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and the metropolitan
government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., the cities of Cape Girardeau,
Mo., Lampos, Cal., and Salt Lake City, Utah. 426 U.S. 836-37 n.7.
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its commerce clause power in derogation of the rights of the states.
The 1974 amendments extended the Act's minimum hour provisions to
all nonsupervisory employees of the states and their political subdivi-
sions. 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of a
three-judge district court8 and invalidated the amendments. The Court
held that the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions "imper-
missibly" interfered9 with the states' sovereign authority'0 to deter-
mine the appropriate wages and hours for those whom they employ to
carry out their governmental functions." Such exercise of congres-
sional authority, the Court concluded, "does not comport with the
federal system of government embodied in the Constitution."
The scope of congressional authority to regulate interstate com-
merce under the commerce clause 3 has been recurrently disputed.
7. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 203, 88 Stat.
62 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)). The original Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch.
676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. IV 1974)), required
every employee engaged in interstate commerce, to be paid a certain minimum hourly
wage and overtime pay. The act defined "employer" to exclude any state or political
subdivision from its coverage, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 203, 52 Stat.
1060. In 1961 Congress extended the Act's coverage to include each employee in an
"enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate
commerce, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)). In 1966 the
Act was once again amended and for the first time coverage extended to public em-
ployees in hospitals, schools and other related institutions, Pub. L. No. 89-691, 80 Stat.
831 (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970)). The effect of the 1974 amendments was to
extend the Act's coverage to approximately five million employees of the states and their
municipalities who were not previously covered by the Act. H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2811-31.
8. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The district court
dismissed the complaint, concluding "since it is uncontested that employees of state and
municipal institutions . . . do make substantial purchases in interstate commerce," the
1974 amendments are constitutional. Id. at 827.
9. 426 U.S. at 851.
10. Id. at 849.
11. In delineating "governmental functions" the court referred to employer-
employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, public health,
and parks and recreation. Id. at 851.
12. Id. at 852.
13. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause was the product of a
compromise between the Federalists, who wanted one centralized government, and the
Anti-Federalists, who advocated independent sovereignty for each of the states. Accord-
ing to Madison, the commerce power was "intended as a negative and preventive
provision against injustice among the states themselves, rather than as a power to be
used for the positive purposes of the general government." Quoted in Hirsch, Federal
Regulation of Local Activity: Demise of "Rational Basis" Test, 1972 L. & Soc. ORD.
683, 686.
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Past challenges have often focused upon the interrelationship between
the national government's regulatory power and the ability of the
states to regulate activities within their territorial boundaries. 14 For
several decades the Supreme Court consistently invalidated federal
legislation that regulated local, intrastate activities on the ground that
such enactments represented unconstitutional intrusions upon state
autonomy.15 This recognition of, and deference to, state governmental
independence stemmed from the notion that the tenth amendment
16
reserved to the states a residue of power that imposed an independent
limitation upon the extension of national authority over local, intra-
state activites.17
Beginning in the mid-1930's, however, the Supreme Court shifted its
focus and began to uphold federal legislation that regulated state ac-
tivities affecting interstate commerce. The Court's landmark decisions
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Is and United States v.
14. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S.
92 (1946); Polish Nat'l Alliance of the United States v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Corp., 315
U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Board of
Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1932).
15. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936) ("[The general
government . . . possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the
states."); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (regulation and control of
agricultural production held beyond the power delegated to the federal government);
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (federal government
cannot regulate wages and hours of persons employed in the internal commerce of the
state); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918) ("There is no power vested in
Congress to require the States to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible
unfair competition."); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) ("The
relief of the citizens of each state from the burden of monopoly and the evils resulting
from the restraint of trade was left with the states to deal with .... ").
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
17. This concept is often referred to as "dual federalism". Proponents of this idea
viewed the tenth amendment as a built-in check on the national power over state matters,
national and state legislative domains being mutually exclusive. Under this theory, the
commerce power was not plenary and was to be exercised only insofar as it did not
encroach on an equal state power to regulate purely domestic commerce. See Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1956); Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
18. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court stated that in regard to those intrastate activities
having such a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce that their control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied power to exercise the control. Id. at 37.
19771
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Darby19 marked the beginning of the application of new constitutional
standards that substantially expanded the breadth of federal commerce
clause power over intrastate matters. 20 The Supreme Court abandoned
its previous adherence to notions of state government autonomy and
rejected the view that the tenth amendment operated as an independ-
ent constraint upon otherwise valid federal regulatory enactments. 2'
The Supreme Court applied this expansive interpretation of the
commerce power to uphold the Fair Labor Standards Act,22 which
Congress enacted in 1938. The Act required every employer to pay
each of his employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce" a certain minimum hourly wage and overtime
pay.23 In United States v. Darby24 a unanimous Supreme Court af-
19. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Darby involved a challenge to the 1938 Fair Labor Standards
Act which established standard minimum wages and maximum hours for employees
engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The Court held that the
power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to those intrastate activities which
so affect interstate commerce as to make their regulation an appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end-the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. Id. at 118. Darby expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918) and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Id. at 123; see note 15
supra. See generally Corwin, Congress'Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Con-
stitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477 (1933).
20. Since the 1937 Jones & Laughlin decision, the Court has not struck down a single
piece of federal economic legislation as beyond the scope of the commerce clause
power. Furthermore, prior to 1964 not one of the 20 Justices appointed to the Court
between 1936 and 1964 had ever dissented from a decision expanding the scope of the
commerce clause. More recently, this trend has begun to weaken. See Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Perez United States, 402 U.S. 146(1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (Douglas & Stewart, J.J., dissenting). See
generally Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Interstate
Crime, 15 ARiz, L. REV. 271 (1973).
21. Chief Justice Stone asserted that "[tihe [tenth] amendment states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941). Cf. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946)(tenth amendment does not
operate as a limitation on the power delegated to the national government); Oklahoma v.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534, (1941)(tenth amendment does not deprive the national
government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which
are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end).
22. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified in 29 U.S.C.
§§201-219 (1970)). The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted to help alleviate the effects
of the Depression. The minimum wage provisions were included so as to insure a basic
standard of living for employees. See Note, The Scope of Coverage Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149 (1973). See generally Willis, The
Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MiAMt L. REV. 607 (1972).
23. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §202, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified in 29
U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970)).
24. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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firmed the constitutionality of the Act, finding a valid exercise of
Congress' commerce clause power. The Darby court reasoned that the
means adopted by the minimum wage and hour provisions were
reasonably and plainly adapted toward the permitted end of protecting
interstate commerce.Y The Supreme Court decisions in both Darby
and Jones established the principle that even though activities may be
intrastate in nature, if they are intimately related to and substantially
affect interstate commerce they may be subject to federal regulation
under the commerce power. 26
Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1966 to extend
its coverage to employees of state-operated schools, hospitals and
other related institutions. 27 In Maryland v. Wirtz,'8 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the amendments. The Court asserted
that the amendments fell within the scope of Congress' commerce
clause authority since there was a "rational basis" for the legislative
determination that labor conditions in schools, hospitals and other
related institutions affect interstate commerce. 29 Although the majority
did not address itself to the tenth amendment issue, the decision
implied that state sovereignty was not a limitation upon congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce. 30
In National League of Cities, appellants successfully argued that
when Congress directly regulates the activities of the states in their
capacity as public employers, it transgresses the tenth amendment's
25. Id. at 124. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end . . . are constitutional.").
26. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
27. Pub. L. No. 89-691, 80 Stat. 831, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
28. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
29. 392 U.S. at 193-99. In Wirtz the Court held that the amendments adopting the
"enterprise concept," which expanded the protection of employees but did not enlarge
the class of employers subject to the Act, were constitutionally valid since there was a
rational basis for the legislative finding that the statutes were necessary for the protec-
tion of commerce. The Court gave credence to both the "competition theory," that a
company's competition in interstate commerce was affected by all its labor conditions,
and the "labor dispute theory," that substandard labor conditions among employees
could lead to strife that would disrupt interstate commerce. The Court also held that the
commerce power provides a constitutional basis for extension of the Act to state-
operated schools and hospitals, and that Congress had interfered with state functions
only to the extent that it subjected a state to the same wage and hour limitations as other
employers whose activites affect commerce.
30. See 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas addressed himself
to the issue of the tenth amendment. He argued: "[W]hat is done here is nonetheless
such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is
in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Id.
1977]
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affirmative limitation upon the commerce clause power.31 Relying on
the Wirtz rationale, the Secretary of Labor argued that the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act constituted a valid exer-
cise of the commerce clause power since employees of state and
municipal institutions who were affected by the 1974 amendments
made substantial purchases in interstate commerce of equipment and
goods .3
2
The majority in National League of Cities held that Congress had
exceeded the authority delegated to it under the commerce clause
because the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act inter-
fered with the independence and autonomy of the states in their
capacities as sovereign governmental units. 33 The Court reasoned that
the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act amendments to state
and municipal employees interfered with "integral governmental ac-
tivities" to such an extent that the amendments were deemed to
exceed the scope of the commerce power.
34
The Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act in National League of Cities repre-
sents a radical departure from the Court's usual posture regarding the
issue of congressional authority to regulate intrastate activities under
the commerce clause.35 Generally, when the Court has reviewed com-
merce clause legislation, the constitutional inquiry has been confined
to a determination of whether the means chosen by Congress are
31. 426 U.S. at 845. Appellants also argued that the national government lacked the
power to control essential state and city government services by increasing the cost of
providing some services so greatly that they must be altered or curtailed. The Court
sustained this contention. Id. at 845-49. But cf. Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970)("[T]he overall purpose of the [Fair Labor
Standards Act] tacitly suggests that the imposition of such [financial strain is out-
weighed by the underlying policy of the Act.").
32. "The basic thrust of the appellee's case is that Congress can regulate State-local
employees wages, hours and overtime matters to ward off dangers of labor disputes
which would diminish state and local use of interstate goods, and dangers of unfair
competition to induce industry to come in and to spread the work." Brief for National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at 34 n.15, National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The appellants argued that the Wirtz rationale was
not applicable in National League of Cities because the state activities covered in Wirtz
were in competition with private hospitals and schools, while the state activities covered
in National League of Cities were not in competition with private industry. See National
League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.D.C. 1974).
33. 426 U.S. at 851.
34. Id.
35. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
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reasonably adapted to a legitimate end. 36 The Court in National League
of Cities, however, dealt only perfunctorily with the issue of whether
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act constituted a
valid exercise of the commerce power.37 Instead, the majority focused
upon the tenth amendment and the necessity of maintaining state
autonomy.38
The Court's holding in National League of Cities rests on the prop-
osition that the states stand on a "different footing" 39 from individuals
and are therefore not subject to the same principles that ordinarily
control the determination of the constitutionality of commerce clause
legislation. The Court asserted that the "dispositive factor" in Nation-
al League of Cities was that the 1974 amendments were directed at the
"states qua states. '4° The Court's preoccupation with the purpose of
the amendments, direct regulation of the states, is a deviation from
years of constitutional precedents which established the principle that
state sovereign interests per se do not impose a limitation on commerce
clause legislation. 41 In prior cases the Supreme Court expressly refused
36. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,262 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
37. "[T]he 1974 amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, encounter a. . . constitutional barrier because they are to be applied
directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers." 426 U.S. at 841. See
Brief for National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at 30, National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) ("An analysis based on the commerce
clause alone prejudges the answer. Explicit consideration must be given to federalism in
developing viable lines between national legislative power and state governmental
autonomy.").
38. "We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Con-
gress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." 426
U.S. at 845.
39. Id. at 854.
40. Id. at 847. The Court emphasized the fact that the 1974 amendments were
distinguishable from other congressional legislation regulating intrastate activites. Past
federal regulations affected only individuals and private business as opposed to the state
governments as a whole.
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the Government
of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a
similar exercise of congressional authority directed not to private citizens but to the
States as States.
Id. at 845. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,549 (1975)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)(states are not immune from
all federal regulations under the commerce clause merely because of their sovereign
status); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ("[Wlhen a State leaves the
sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional
1977]
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to determine the validity of commerce clause legislation on the basis of
whether the interest at stake was "governmental" or "proprietary.
42
In holding that "functions essential to the separate and independent
existence" of the states could not be abrogated by the federal govern-
ment,43 the Court, in effect, resurrected previously moribund tenth
amendment considerations. 44 Although the Court recognized that the
1974 amendments, in isolation, represented a valid exercise of the
commerce clause power,45 the Court apparently relied on the inviola-
bility of state autonomy as a barrier to federal regulations.' This
approach contravenes the well-established principle that the commerce
power may not be impeded or qualified by state regulatory measures. 47
The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act would have
subjected all state and local governments, with respect to all of their
non-supervisory employees, to the jurisdiction of the Federal Depart-
ment of Labor regarding wages, hours and overtime pay provisions. 48
regulation, it subjects itself to the regulation as fully as if it were a private person or
corporation."); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936)(If a state is engag-
ing in economic activities that are validly regulated by the federal government when
engaged in by private persons, the state may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulations.).
42. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175 (1936); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
43. 426 U.S. 845.
44. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
45. 426 U.S. 851-52. See note 38 supra.
46. See Brief for National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at
14, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). But see Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The Court in Parden articulated the idea that the states,
through their representatives, surrendered a portion of their state sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.
47. Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933) (exercise of the
commerce power "may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to any extent by state
action"); cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968) ("[I]t is clear that the Federal
Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing state
interests .... "); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330
U.S. 767, 780 (1947) ("Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full
extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause .... "); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102
(1946) (". . . the Tenth Amendment 'does not operate as a limitation upon the powers,
express or implied, delegated to the National Government.' "); United States v. Califor-
nia, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936) ("The sovereign power of the states is necessarily di-
minished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the
Constitution.").
48. Under the 1974 amendments, minimum wage coverage was extended to the
following employees: federal employees, state and local governmental employees,
domestic service employees, retail and service employees, conglomerate agricultural
employees, telegraph agency employees, motion picture theatre employees, logging
employees. Overtime compensation pay coverage would reach federal employees, state
[Vol. 13:169
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In its narrowest terms, the decision in National League of Cities
overruled Wirtz49 and invalidated the 1974 Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments in their application to state employees in areas that have
traditionally been regarded as integral parts of state governmental
activities.50
The rationale of the Court's decision, however, is much broader. It
is clear that the majority's primary concern in National League of
Cities centered upon the direct impact of the Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments upon the internal functions of the state governments.51
The Court's decision was predicated upon the belief that the autonomy
and independence of the states should be preserved52 and that the
ability of the federal governemnt to intervene in local matters must be
checked. 53 In essence, the majority introduced a novel constitutional
approach regarding the balance between the national government's
regulatory powers and the sovereignty of the states.5 4 The Court's
holding recognized an inherent, affirmative constitutional limitation
upon the power of the federal government to regulate the states,55
unless the intrusion on state sovereignty constitutes an emergency
measure which is limited and temporary.5 6 Therefore, according to the
and local government employees, domestic service employees, retail and service em-
ployees, seasonal agricultural processing employees, hotel, motel and restaurant em-
ployees, food service employees, nursing home employees and local transit employees.
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2811-31.
49. 426 U.S. 854: "[Wie do not believe the reasoning in Wirtz may any longer be
regarded as authoritative."
50. Id. at 852.
51. Id. at 846.
52. Id. at 851-52.
53. Id. at 855. "[W]e agree that such assertions of power, if unchecked, would...
allow the National Government to devour the essentials of state sovereignty."
54. The majority was not concerned with the legitimacy of the national policy of the
amendments. Rather, the majority was primarily concerned with the effect the amend-
ments would have had upon the states' abilities to govern themselves. See Brief for
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at 41-42, National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
55. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,557 (1975)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
tenth amendment is an example of
mhe understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that theStates were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative authority
could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to
act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a state as if it were just another
individual or business subject to regulation.
Id.
56. Id. at 548.
1977]
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rationale offered in National League of Cities, a congressional act may
be within the scope of the commerce power, but nonetheless invali-
dated because it collides with state sovereignty. 57
Although the Court states that its holding does not undercut other
decisions on the issue of congressional power to regulate intrastate
activities under the commerce clause, 58 the decision may have far-
reaching implications. Perhaps it is possible to view the holding as an
isolated and politically expedient decision prompted by the current
fiscal crisis threatening many metropolitan and state governments. 59
On the other hand, the opinion may indicate that future congressional
legislation affecting the states' internal activities may be subjected to a
very strict standard of review. 6° In any event, the decision demon-
strates an emerging concern for the governmental independence of the
states.
Linda Reiman
57. The majority stated: "If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to
make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for perform-
ance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States'
separate and independent existence.' " 426 U.S. at 851.
58. Id. at 852-55.
59. The majority spent a great deal of time addressing itself to the additional costs
that would be imposed on the cities and states if they complied with the amendments. Id.
at 846. See National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.D.C. 1974),
rev'd sub nom., National League of Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
There is evidence that the impact of the 1974 Amendments, in terms of confusing
and complex regulations and an enormous fiscal burden on the states, is so exten-
sive that it may seriously affect the structuring of state and municipal governmental
activities by reducing flexibility to adapt to local and special circumstances, as
through compensatory time-off arrangements . ...
See also Brief for National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at 34,
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) ("The monetary impact [of the
amendments] is real and not de minimis.").
60. See generally Brief for National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus
Curiae, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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